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BANKRUPTCY AND UNBUNDLING:

61

and Water?
By Professor Gary E. Sullivanand Jessica M. Zorn

Unbundling legal serviceS-also

known as "limited

scope representation" or "discrete task representation"
-allows an attorney to restrict her representation of a client to a specific
task or issue instead of handling a client's matter comprehensively from
beginning to end. Alabama Rule of ProfessionalConduct 1.2 has always
allowed for limited scope representation, but the practice was sparsely
used until specific procedures and forms became available in 2012.1
There are three general categories for discrete task representation: consultation and advice, limited representation in court and document preparation. Although unbundling in general litigation or simple transactional
matters can create benefits that inure to both lawyer and client, unbundling and bankruptcy practice make strange bedfellows.
Generally, any attorney/client agreement involving an unbundled legal
service must comply with the Rules of ProfessionalConduct and other applicable laws.' In the context of bankruptcy, attorneys must also comply
with the local rules of the particular bankruptcy court, the FederalRules of
Bankruptcy Procedure and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The difficulty of rectifying a limited scope representation agreement with bankruptcy rules and
practice raises serious doubts as to the feasibility of unbundling services
when representing debtors in bankruptcy courts in Alabama.

Limited scope representation increases access to the legal system for
lower- and middle-income litigants who may not be able to afford an attorney offering comprehensive services.4
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This argument is particularly persuasive in the bankruptcy context because attorneys' fees have increased
since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).'
Attorney fees after BAPCPA increased as much as 24
percent for Chapter 13 filers and-notably-48 percent
for Chapter 7 debtors.6 BAPCPA's enactment likely
caused such cost increases because debtors must file
more documents than before,7 the means test may require complicated calculations and the statute made attorneys responsible for errors in a debtor's schedule.
"Just as insurers charge higher premiums for greater
risks and increased work, attorneys have charged
higher fees to offset their new risks."' As filing bankruptcy becomes more expensive, fewer debtors can afford an attorney; limited scope representation has been
proposed as a solution to this problem.
Unbundling provides certain benefits to attorneys as
well. Discrete task representation ostensibly creates
an opportunity for lawyers to expand their practice
and market to lower-income clients.9 Lawyers may be
able to provide assistance to clients they might otherwise not have the time or inclination to fully represent."0 These opportunities allow attorneys to collect
additional fees where none existed (although, on the
other hand, litigants who would have hired a full-service attorney may now choose to only hire an attorney
for one or two tasks, thereby actually lowering the
fees an attorney collects).
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As a general rule, unbundled service agreements
must comply with all applicable ethical and procedural
rules. In bankruptcy, however, attorneys may face difficulty rectifying a limited scope agreement with specific
rules governing bankruptcy practice. The Bankruptcy
Code does not mandate that an attorney fully represent
a client, but most local rules nationally signal that an
attorney should comprehensively represent her client."
The Alabama Rules of ProfessionalConduct allow an
attorney to limit the scope of representation if the
agreement is reasonable under the circumstances.
Lawyers should decline to offer unbundled legal services in the practice of bankruptcy because limited
September 2016

scope agreements raise serious concerns as to the attorney's compliance with other rules, thereby rendering a
limited scope representation unreasonableunder the
circumstances.

A. Informed Consent Concerns
In general, "[a] lawyer may limit the scope of representation if . . . the client gives inftrmed consent.""
In order for a client to give informed consent, the attorney must disclose a wide array of information. 4
Bankruptcy attorneys face an ethical dilemma: the
bankruptcy landscape is unusually complicated and
technical. Can a client really give informed consent?
A debtor may wrongly assume that excluded services-like representation in adversary proceedings-are
unnecessary, or that there is little risk to foregoing
representation on those matters. The ethical concerns
are heightened when one considers that the limited
scope agreement ". . . comes at the suggestion of an

attorney who often benefits from and has superior
knowledge of the possible ramifications of excluding
certain services."" Will attorneys fully disclose the
risks of limited representation, including the decreased probability of the debtor receiving a discharge? In a related vein, the pressure of needing to
file bankruptcy might cause a debtor to accept whatever terms are presented to her. The reliance on a
lawyer's guidance is therefore heightened in bankruptcy proceedings. A debtor's ability to provide
valid, informed consent is highly suspect considering
a client's likely inability to grasp the materiality of a
service and the consequences of its omission.

B. Competency Concerns
An attorney must provide competent representation
to her clients.' This duty is not waived by entering
into a limited scope agreement.
Competent representation in the context of bankruptcy means that an attorney must help meet the
debtor's objective of obtaining a discharge,' 8 and yet
largely pro se litigants are far less likely to receive a
discharge."
Can representation be considered competent if it fails
to achieve the client's objectives for obtaining representation (i.e. obtaining a successful discharge)? Some
courts have already answered "no"-competent representation precludes lawyers from picking aspects of
bankruptcy cases to work on and neglecting others.'
The issue remains to be squarely addressed in Alabama.

C. Diligence Concerns

Whereas normally
an attorney must
investigate good
grounds to support
a pleading,
attorneys who are
only representing
their clients in a
limited capacity
have the ability to
rely on the client's
communications
unless there is
reason not to

A lawyer may face difficulty reconciling the duty of diligence"'
under a discrete task representation
scheme. The duty of diligence-in
the civil litigation context-is somewhat relaxed when it comes to filing pleadings. Whereas normally an
attorney must investigate good
grounds to support a pleading, attorneys who are only representing
their clients in a limited capacity
have the ability to rely on the
client's communications unless
there is reason not to do so. 2 2 Less
diligence is required of an attorney
drafting a civil pleading as an unbundled service.
In bankruptcy proceedings, however, attorneys are bound by local
rules of the particular bankruptcy
court, the FederalRules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Neither Fed. R. Banki:
Proc. 9011(b) nor II U.S. Code
§707(b)(4)(C), governing pleadings,
allows for a relaxation of the duty of
diligence for bankruptcy attorneys
offering unbundled services. This
may render a wide swath of limited
scope representation infeasible; for
example, it might defeat the purpose of unbundling for
an attorney to exercise diligence and research all aspects of a limited client's petition if the attorney is getting paid a nominal amount to simply prepare a
schedule. Limited scope bankruptcy attorneys, held to
a higher standard of diligence by the FederalRules of
Bankruptcy Procedureand the Bankruptcy Code, must
be careful to satisfy their duty of diligence.

for debtors. In 2007, the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project found that the
percentage of pro se litigants rose
after the passage of BAPCPA, but
the percentage of pro se litigants
who received a successful discharge
fell." Shockingly, "[t]he entire
post-BAPCPA increase in negative
pro se outcomes is attributable to
cases in which the debtors were alleged to have made technical errors."24 Bankruptcy is simply too
complicated for unrepresented
debtors to navigate and discharges
are being withheld on the basis of
procedural, technical errors instead
of on the merits of the filing.
Not only do the debtors themselves suffer if they litigate functionally pro se, but the courts
themselves suffer. Debtors who are
pro se or who only received assistance with documents are more
likely to miss deadlines, neglect
legal responsibilities and experience
difficulties applying both procedural
and substantive law. 25 Bankruptcy
courts are likely to be increasingly
burdened because "[slelf-represented [or largely self-represented]
litigants consume a disproportional
amount of staff and judicial time."26
Lastly, the widespread implementation of limited
scope representation may hamper the administration
of justice because it has a disparate effect on debtors
versus creditors. Creditors are unlikely to forego outright, complete representation, but debtors in financial
distress are looking for the least expensive route.
Overall, debtors may receive worse judicial outcomes
and creditors would remain unaffected.
The practice of discrete task representation therefore gives rise to very serious ethical concerns in the
context of bankruptcy practice. Empirically, it is difficult to rectify professional rules with a constrained
representation agreement; although jurisdictions are
increasingly recognizing the permissibility of unbundling, findings that bankruptcy attorneys followed
the ethical rules in doing so are rare.27 The merits of

do so.22

D. Administration of Justice Concerns
The administration of justice in bankruptcy courts
would suffer if litigants choose to forego outright representation for representation in a limited capacity.
First, limited scope representation may increase overall access to the bankruptcy system, but it would also
likely increase the number of functionally pro se litigants. This would likely not lead to favorable outcomes
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8. MacArthur, 25 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. at 434.

limited scope agreements may render the practice
helpful and even necessary in some areas of law, but
bankruptcy attorneys should proceed with caution or
altogether avoid it.

10. McLain, 71 Ala. Law at 402.
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